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Abstract This paper presents an abstract specification of an enforcement mechanism
of usage control for Grids, and verifies formally that such mechanism enforces UCON
policies. Our technique is based on KAOS, a goal-oriented requirements engineering
methodology with a formal LTL-based language and semantics. KAOS is used in a
bottom-up form. We abstract the specification of the enforcement mechanism from
current implementations of usage control for Grids. The result of this process is agent
and operation models that describe the main components and operations of the en-
forcement mechanism. KAOS is used in top-down form by applying goal-refinement
in order to refine UCON policies. The result of this process is a goal-refinement tree,
which shows how a goal (policy) can be decomposed into sub-goals. Verification that
a policy can be enforced is then equivalent to prove that a goal can be implemented
by the enforcement mechanism represented by the agent and operation models.
Keywords Access Control · Grid Authorisation · Usage Control
1 Introduction
Grids [1] and Data Grids [2] are technologies providing access to large-scale dis-
tributed computing and storage capabilities that span multiple administrative domains
and are anchored on a variety of operating systems and technologies. This heteroge-
neous distribution of resources requires scalable, flexible, and fine-grained access
control to protect both individual and shared resources. At the same time, any access
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control mechanism must be driven by well-structured and well-formulated policy
goals capturing the requirements of the resources, their providers and their users.
This paper studies the formulation of the requirements of fine-grained access con-
trol enforcement in Grid systems as a case-study in how security policy requirements
can be formalised in large-scale distributed systems. Fine-grained access control tech-
niques, or also known as usage control, extend traditional access control mechanisms
by controlling data and resources usage as well as their access at the entry point [3,4].
The application of usage control techniques to Grid systems has been demonstrated
in the past in works such as [5,6]. Here we adopt the reference usage control model
as proposed by Park and Sandhu in [3], which is also known as the UCONabc model.
Our approach is to define a usage-based Grid authorisation architecture, which
uses the functional components of the current Grid systems as outlined by the Open
Grid Forum (OGF)1 group on Grid authorisation (part of the Security Area). We focus
on two important aspects in the design of policy-based management systems: the
refinement of policies expressed as requirements on the system, and the specification
of enforcement mechanisms derived from the above requirements. In formalising the
requirements of an enforcement mechanism for Grid UCONabc policies, we adopt
the KAOS requirements-engineering methodology [7].
Our approach is to use the KAOS methodology to show how one can abstractly
specify a UCONabc policy as a goal or a requirement on the system and its resources.
The specification is expressed in the temporal linear logic-based language provided
by KAOS. We then derive the KAOS agent and operation models for each of the
requirements (polices) specified. This way, we formally show that the enforcement
mechanism is sound and complete, and capable of enforcing all the policies pertain-
ing to the UCONabc family of core models. For reasons of conciseness, we limit
ourselves in this paper to the refinement of a couple of UCONabc models, namely the
PreA0 and OnA3 models [8]. Nonetheless, the approach is general to be applied to
the rest of the UCONabc family of models.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we give some back-
ground on the UCON model providing an overview of the various elements that con-
stitute the model. We then review the existing literature related to UCON implemen-
tations for Grid systems in Section 3, and we define a reference architecture for Grid
usage control, which is based on OGF’s OGSA architecture. In Section 4, we give an
overview of the KAOS requirements engineering methodology and its various mod-
els. This methodology is then used to formalise an abstract specification of a Grid
UCON enforcement mechanism in Section 5, and in Section 6, we use KAOS to
derive the enforcement mechanism operations for a couple of UCON policy exam-
ples; PreA0 (Section 6.1) and OnA3 (Section 6.2). Finally, we discuss related work
in Section 7 and conclude the paper in Section 8 giving directions for future work.
2 The UCONabc Model
The UCONabc usage control model is a framework defined by Park and Sandhu [3,
9] for the specification of fine-grained access and usage control policies. Henceforth,
1 Web address: http://www.ogf.org
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we simply refer to this framework as UCON. In UCON, subjects (i.e. users) and ob-
jects (i.e. computational resources) may have mutable as well as immutable attributes,
thereby facilitating the continuity of the decision-making process when enforcing se-
curity policies. This means that the decision to allow a user access to a resource is
continuously reviewed before and during the user’s access to the resource. The de-
cisions themselves are based not only on authorisations, but also on obligations and
conditions. As Grid resources must continuously be monitored for efficient use since
the applications that utilise them are generally computationally intensive, the UCON
model becomes an attractive security policy solution that can offer fine-grained mon-
itoring and control of such resources.
Elements of the UCON model include:
– Subjects, Objects and Rights: The subject is the entity that exercises rights, i.e. that
executes access operations on objects. An object, instead, is an entity that is ac-
cessed by subjects through access operations. Rights are the privileges that sub-
jects can exercise on objects. UCON determines the existence of a right dynami-
cally, whenever a subject attempts to access and exercise a right on some object.
– Attributes: Both subjects and objects have attributes. These attributes can be mu-
table, i.e. they can change over time and be updated, or immutable, i.e. they are
constant and cannot change over time. An example of a mutable attribute is the
number of times that a subject accesses an object, whereas an immutable is a
subject’s or an object’s identity.
– Predicates: Predicates are logical statements about the subjects’ and objects’ at-
tributes and the requested right. Predicates can be either authorisation, obligation
or condition predicates or any combination of these. Authorisation predicates ex-
press set rules that determine whether to grant the requested right or not, and
could exploit both attributes of subjects and objects. The evaluation of the pred-
icates can be performed before or during the execution of an action. Obligation
predicates are UCON decision factors that are used to verify whether the sub-
ject has satisfied some mandatory requirements before performing an action or
whether the subject continuously satisfies these requirements while performing
the action. Finally, condition predicates are environmental or system-oriented de-
cision factors, i.e. dynamic factors that do not depend on subjects or objects. Con-
dition predicates are evaluated at runtime when the subject attempts to perform
the access, and they can be evaluated before or during an action.
The complete UCONabc family of models encompasses several factors. These
factors include the presence of Authorisations (A), oBligations (B) and Conditions
(C), pre- and on-going decisions, as well as the mutability of attributes (immutable
(0), mutable preUpdate (1), mutable onUpdate (2) and mutable postUpdate (3)).
The various UCON models differ in the presence of attribute updates and in the se-
quentiality of the operations taking place. Therefore, an enforcement mechanism for
UCON policies must be able to enforce not only the single operations, but the se-
quence in which these operations are invoked. The different actions that subjects and
the system can perform in the UCON model relate to the different phases of an ob-
ject’s usage. Given that the triple (s, o, r) represents the subject s requesting the right
r for accessing the object o, we consider the following set of actions [8]:
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(i) tryaccess(s, o, r): performed by subject s when performing a new access request,
(ii) permitaccess(s, o, r): performed by the system when granting the access,
(iii) denyaccess(s, o, r): performed by the system when rejecting the access,
(iv) revokeaccess(s, o, r): performed by the system when revoking an ongoing access,
(v) endaccess(s, o, r): performed by s when ending an access,
(vi) update(s, o, r): performed by the system to update a subject’s or an object’s at-
tributes, anytime before, during or after the access and usage of the object.
The various stages of the UCON access and usage control are shown in Figure 1.
Fig. 1 Access and usage control stages in the UCON model [8]
All the UCON authorisation policies are defined for positive permissions: if there
is no policy to enable the permission according to the attribute values, then the access
is denied by default. This is sometimes called the closed system assumption, whereby
no policy is specified to deny an access in a system. The same holds for obligation
and condition core models.
3 Usage Control for Grids
In this section, we first review some reference implementations of UCON for Grids.
Then, using notions extracted from the implementations and from the OGF’s Open
Grids Services Architecture (OGSA) authorisation working group,2 we introduce the
target Grid security architecture for our UCON-policy enforcement mechanism.
There exists a number of implementations of the UCON model tailored for Grid
systems, e.g.[5,10,6,11]. In [5,10], the authors provide a model of usage control
for computational Grids, following Park and Sandhu’s UCONabc model [3]. One of
the contributions of their work is the use of a special process algebra, called the
POlicy Language based on Process Algebra (POLPA). POLPA is used as a policy
specification language, which is especially suitable to model usage control policies
related to the UCONabc model. The process algebra is also capable of expressing the
order in which the security-relevant actions are to be performed.
2 Web address: https://redmine.ogf.org/projects/ogsa-authz-wg/
Modelling Fine-Grained Access Control Policies in Grids 5
The POLPA-based prototype implements an architecture where the main compo-
nents are a Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) and a Policy Decision Point (PDP), such
as is the architecture in most of the common distributed authorisation systems [12].
The PEP receives a request from an external user and generates a tryaccess(s, o, r)
action that it sends to the PDP. Similarly, when the subject ends their access to the ob-
ject, the PEP generates an endaccess(s, o, r) action to the PDP. The PDP gets the se-
curity policy from a repository, exploits its representation and determines whether the
access should or should not be allowed, returning to the PEP a permitaccess(s, o, r)
or a denyaccess(s, o, r) action. The PDP continuously evaluates a set of given au-
thorisations, conditions and obligations while an access is in progress, and it could
invoke the PEP to terminate the access through the revokeaccess(s, o, r) action, if any
of the predicates associated with it becomes false.
In [6], Zhang et al. propose a UCON prototype implementation for Grids and col-
laborative applications, by following a layered approach with policy enforcement and
implementation models, called the Policy-Enforcement-Implementation (PEI) frame-
work. The security architecture leverages a centralised attribute repository in each
virtual organisation and a usage monitor in each resource provider for attribute man-
agement. The policies are specified with the eXtensible Access Control Markup Lan-
guage (XACML) [12], which, as recognised by the same authors, suffers from the
impossibility to exactly encode an abstract UCONabc policy, this is despite the fact
that in recent years, some works (e.g. [13,14]) have attempted to use XACML to en-
code usage control, to varying degrees of success. Within the architecture, both PDP
and PEP are located on the resource provider side. For an access, the PDP collects
the subject and object attributes, the system attributes, and makes the usage control
decision, which is enforced by the PEP. The immutable subject attributes are pushed
to the PDP by the requesting subject.
Related to the above POLPA language and policy enforcement architecture, [15],
have proposes a couple of methods for testing any implementation of the architecture
based on two strategies; a fault-based to uncover vulnerabilities and problems that
may occur during a PDP implementation, and the other is based on conditions cov-
erage with a methodology for simulating the continuous control of the PDP during
the runtime execution. In [11], an architecture and implementation were proposed for
enforcing UCON policies in a Grid system, based on the Globus Grid middleware3
[16]. The architecture extended that for POLPA, and the language used was also a
simplified version of the POLPA policy language.
In [17], the OGSA authorisation working group proposed some functional com-
ponents for a Grid service provider authorisation service middleware. In their work,
great attention was put on credentials, defined as attribute assertions digitally signed
by the issuer that can be cryptographically validated. Credentials can be issued by
Credential Issuing Services (CISs) and validated by Credential Validation Services
(CVSs), which return the valid attributes of the subject. Other functional components
comprise the usual PDP and PEP components, as well as Context Handlers (CHs)
responsible for handling the communications between PEPs, CVSs and PDPs. The
interactions between these functional components can be constructed in four different
3 Web address: https://www.globus.org
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ways, according to whether the credentials and the authorisation decisions are pulled
or pushed.
A usage-based Grid authorisation architecture does not require changing the way
the functional components interact with one another. As the reader can see in Figure
2, an access requestor (a Grid User) pushes his/her credentials to a PEP. Then, after
the CH obtains valid attributes from the CVS, a PDP is interrogated for an authorisa-
tion decision, which in the end is returned to the PEP. From a UCON point of view,
valid attributes released by a CVS are examples of immutable (persistent) attributes,
and would include information such as the name or identity of the user. A complex
UCON PDP should be able to evaluate policies where the predicates are statements
about the subjects’ and objects’ attributes. Three sub-components, namely the Refer-
ence Monitor, the Predicate Validator and the Attribute Manager make up the UCON
PDP. They are explained with details in Section 5.
External components are needed to supply the UCON PDP with the needed in-
formation: (i) a Virtual Organisation (VO) UCON policy repository provides the PDP
with the UCON policies to be evaluated, (ii) a meta-data repository provides the PDP
with the optional immutable object attributes, (iii) a VO attributes repository stores
the mutable attributes of the subjects, and finally (iv) a Resource Provider (RP) at-
tributes repository stores the mutable attributes of the objects.
Access Requestor
VO CIS
Local
CIS
CVS
PEPUserAuthentication
Context
Handler
2. Push
Credentials
1. Pull Credentials
5. Optional pull
more Credentials
3. Request
Usage Decision
4. AuthNName
/ID Reference
Monitor
Predicate
Validator
Attr ibute
Manager
RP Attributes
repository
8. Mutable
Attr ibutes
6. Valid 
Credentials
UCON
PDP
9. Usage
Decision
7. Immutable
subject
attr ibutes
VO UCON
policy
repository
7. UCON
policy
7. Immutable
object
attr ibutes
Meta-data
repository
VO Attributes
repository
Fig. 2 A usage-based Grid authorisation architecture where credentials are pushed
For an access, the PDP collects the immutable subject and object attributes, as
well as search for the UCON policies to be enforced. The policy is selected using
the access requestor ID (the UCON subject), and the UCON object requested. Mu-
table subject and object attributes are pulled by the PDP from the VO’s centralized
attribute repository, and from the local RP’s usage monitor. The updates of muta-
ble subjects’ and objects’ attributes are performed by the Attribute Manager. Since
we only deal with the UCONa family of core models, the usage-based Grid authori-
sation architecture does not take into consideration components for obligations and
conditions-based decisions.
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4 KAOS or Keep All Objects Satisfied
Knowledge Acquisition in autOmated Specification (KAOS) [18], or sometimes re-
ferred to as “Keep All Objects Satisfied”, is a generic methodology based on captur-
ing, structuring and precise formulation of system goals [7,18]. A goal is a prescrip-
tive description of system properties, formulated in non-operational terms. A system
includes not only the software to be developed but also its environment. Goals are
refined and operationalised in a top-down manner as the system is designed, or with
a bottom-up approach while re-engineering existing systems. The approach also sup-
ports adverse environments, composed of possibly malicious external agents trying to
undermine the system goal rather than to collaborate in the goal fulfilment. As a Grid
system is typically composed of a large number of nodes interacting in an open and
adverse environment, this approach fits our needs well and although we do not deal
here with Grid attacks and vulnerabilities, this would be interesting future research.
The KAOS methodology offers a number of models:
– The goal model captures and structures the assumed and required properties of a
system by formalising a property as a top-level goal, which is then refined to inter-
mediate subgoals and finally to low-level requirements representing goals that can
be operationalised. Goals may be organised in AND/OR refinement-abstraction
hierarchies. AND-refinement links relate a goal to a set of sub-goals possibly
conjoined with domain properties or environment assumptions; this means that
satisfying all subgoals in the refinement is a sufficient condition in the domain
for satisfying the goal. OR-refinement links relate a goal to a set of alternative
refinements.
– The agent model assigns goals to agents in a realisable way. Agents include soft-
ware components that exist or are to be developed, external devices, and humans
in the environment. Discovering all the responsible agents is one of the criteria
for stopping a goal-refinement process.
– The object model is used to identify the concepts of the application domain that
are relevant to the requirements and to provide static constraints on the opera-
tional systems that will satisfy the requirements. The object model consists of ob-
jects from the domain, such as any resources and relationships among resources.
– The operation model details, at state-transition level, the actions an agent has to
perform to realise the goals and requirements it is responsible for.
The KAOS language has a two-layer structure: an outer conceptual modelling
layer for declaring concepts (such as goals, objects, agents, etc.) and links between
concepts (such as goal refinements, responsibility assignments of goals to agents,
etc.), and an inner assertion layer for formally defining concepts. The rigour of the
KAOS methodology stems from the fact that any concept defined within its models
incorporates formal definitions using Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) [19] formulae.
LTL formulae consist of combinations of the usual first-order predicate logic opera-
tors (∧∨¬ →↔) along with the following temporal operators expressed on predicates
P and Q:
P , which says that P is always true from now on
♦P , which says that P will be true sometime in the future
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◦P , which says that P will be true in the next state
P , which says that P was always true till now
P , which says that P was true at sometime in the past
•P , which says that P was true in the previous state
PSQ, which says that Q has been true since a time when P was true
PUQ, which says that Q will be true until a time when P will be true
We also write a couple of shorthand notations: (P ⇒ Q) to mean (P → Q) and
(P ⇔ Q) to mean (P ⇒ Q) ∧ (P ⇐ Q), and we also utilise the bounded forms of
all of the above operators, as we shall see in Section 6.2.
Figure 3 shows an overview of the four KAOS models and their inter-relations.
Fig. 3 Overview of the KAOS models and their inter-relationships [20]
5 An Abstract Specification of a Grid UCON Enforcement Mechanism
Our main focus in this paper is on the sub-family of UCON models known as UCONa,
which is concerned with controlling authorisation decisions only (i.e. neither obliga-
tions nor condition factors are considered). Henceforth, we use the terms UCON and
UCONa interchangeably. In this section, we define an abstract specification of an en-
forcement mechanism for UCONa policies using the LTL-based requirement speci-
fication language provided by KAOS. The specification has been partially abstracted
from the usage-based authorisation architecture of Section 3, while the operations are
inferred from UCON’s formal definitions presented in [8] and overviewed in Section
2. Figure 4 shows an illustration of the UCON PDP components as KAOS agents,
and the operations those components (agents) can perform. We identify three agents
in addition to the Subject agent (i.e. the Grid user):
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Fig. 4 UCONa enforcement mechanism expressed in terms of KAOS agents and operations
i) Attribute Manager (AM), which updates the attributes and returns their values,
ii) Predicate Validator (PV), which validates the policy predicates, and
iii) Reference Monitor (RM), which is a gateway for all the authorisation decisions
generated by the UCON policy enforcement mechanism.
The RM is responsible for performing the PermitAccess, DenyAccess and RevokeAc-
cess operations. These operations are performed in response to a TryAccess per-
formed by the subject. The subject also performs an EndAccess, which corresponds
to an application cleanly signalling its end of use of the Grid resources. The PV can
be invoked for the validation of the predicates, viz. performing the PredicateValida-
tion operation. The AM can be invoked for the update of the UCON attributes with
the AttributeUpdate operation.
We now provide a written operational software specification of most of the op-
erations shown in Figure 4 using the KAOS operation model. We do not specify
TryAccess nor EndAccess since they are subject-specific operations outside the scope
of the enforcement mechanism; part of the environment (context) of the mechanism.
Each operation defines a state-transition in the application domain, defined through
domain pre- and post-conditions. Operations have input and output fields; for exam-
ple, subject, object and right are input parameters to the operations PermitAccess,
DenyAccess and RevokeAccess.
Operation: PermitAccess
Perf By: Reference Monitor
Domain Pre-Condition:
¬ RM.permitaccess(s, o, r)
Domain Post-Condition:
RM.permitaccess(s, o, r)
Input: subject, object, right
Operation: DenyAccess
Perf By: Reference Monitor
Domain Pre-Condition:
¬ RM.DenyAccess(s, o, r)
Domain Post-Condition:
RM.DenyAccess(s, o, r)
Input: subject, object, right
Operation: RevokeAccess
Perf By: Reference Monitor
Domain Pre-Condition:
¬ RM.RevokeAccess(s, o, r)
Domain Post-Condition:
RM.RevokeAccess(s, o, r)
Input: subject, object, right
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Operation: PredicateValidation
Perf By: Predicate Validator
Domain Pre-Condition:
¬ PV.validate(p1 ∧ . . .∧ pn )
Domain Post-Condition:
PV.validate(p1 ∧ . . .∧ pn )
Input: Set of Predicates p1, . . . , pn
Output: ValidationResponse
Operation: AttributeUpdate
Perf By: Attribute Manager
Domain Pre-Condition:
Domain Post-Condition:
AM.update(s, o, r)
Input: Attribute, Operation, Value
Output: Attribute, Value
In KAOS, an important distinction is made between descriptive domain pre- and
post-conditions and prescriptive required pre-, post- and trigger conditions. The re-
quired pre-condition captures a permission to perform the operation only if the con-
dition is true. By contrast, the required post-condition defines some additional condi-
tions that any application of the operation must establish. The required trigger con-
dition captures an obligation to perform the operation if the condition becomes true
provided the domain precondition is true. Domain conditions are a property of the op-
eration itself hence they have a static definition, whereas the required conditions re-
late to the satisfaction of a specific goal/requirement and hence their definition varies
according to the goal/requirement the operation is assigned to.
6 Using KAOS as a Formal Specification Proof Language
Policy refinement is concerned with the transformation of a high-level abstract policy
specification into a low-level concrete format that can be directly enforced [21]. The
policy refinement process includes, generally, the following three steps:
(1) Determining the resources that are needed to satisfy the requirements of a policy
(2) Translating the high-level policies into operational policies that can be enforced
(3) Verifying that the lower level policies actually meet the requirements specified at
the higher levels
Here, we follow the goal-based approach to policy refinement introduced by Ban-
dara et al. in [22], which uses the KAOS goal-refinement methodology. KAOS is
appropriate for this task since it includes a rigours notation for representing goals
and strategies to refine a goal into a set of subgoals, and ultimately implementable
requirements. The refined subgoals imply the parent goal and are more detailed.
A goal refinement is correct if it is complete, consistent, and minimal. A set of
goals {G1, G2, . . . , Gn} correctly refines a parent goal G under some domain as-
sumptions and properties, D, if the following corresponding conditions hold:
G1, . . . , Gn, D ⇒ G (completeness)
G1, . . . , Gn, D 6⇒ false (consistency)∧
j 6=iGj , D 6⇒ G for any i ∈ [1..n] (minimality)
More informal explanation of these properties can be found in [18]. Verifications can
then be made on goal refinements to ensure that the system meets the goals and that
the goal model is well-formed with respect to the above properties.
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Our approach is to define how a UCONa policy can be enforced in terms of the re-
quired operations and agents, given its definition as a KAOS goal. More specifically,
we can state that our top-level goal is as follows:
∀s : subject, o : object, r : right
permitaccess(s, o, r)⇒ policyEnforcing(s, o, r)
Where policyEnforcing(s, o, r) is a predicate that states that the UCON policy in place
is being enforced and it may have various forms depending on the particular UCON
model adopted. This goal states that if a request from a subject to an object to execute
a right is to be permitted, it must be the case that the UCON policy in place to protect
the object is being enforced.
We also define when to enforce a policy. For example, each policy pertaining to
a PreA0 model need to be enforced only before the access is actually granted, while
policies pertaining to a PreA3 model need to be enforced not only before the access,
but also after the access has ended. Moreover, for the case of OnA-type policies, the
policy must also be enforced during the access period. To demonstrate our approach,
in this paper we only consider two examples of policies: PreA0 and OnA3.
6.1 Refinement and Operationalisation of the UCON PreA0 Policy Model
In the PreA0 model, a usage control decision is determined by authorisations before
the usage, and there are no attribute updates before, during, or after this usage. Dis-
cretionary Access Control (DAC) with Access Control Lists (ACLs) is a classical
example of such PreA0-type of policies. An immutable subject attribute could be its
identity while an immutable object attribute could be an ACL, acl, which consists of
pairs (id, r), where id refers to a subject’s identity, and r refers to a right with which
the subject can access the object. The predicate to be satisfied in order for access to
be granted can be written as ((s.id, r) ∈ o.acl).
We require the policy (expressing the above predicate) to be enforced in some
state prior to when the access was permitted. Therefore we write the top goal as:
Goal [PermitPreA0]
RefinedTo: [Permit], [CheckPredicates], [TryToAccess]
FormalDef: ( ∀ s:subject, o:object, r:right )
permitaccess(s, o, r)⇒  policyEnforcing(s, o, r)
Where policyEnforcing(s, o, r) is a predicate stating that the ACL policy is being
enforced. We apply a first goal refinement, as shown in Figure 5(a), where the formal
sub-goals’ definitions follow. We can use tools, such as the FAUST toolkit [23], to
demonstrate that the refinement is correct.
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PermitPreA0
Permit CheckPredicates TryToAccess
(a) Initial goal refinement of the UCON PreA0 core model
Permit CheckPredicates
Permit Monitor/Control PermitToAccess CP Monitor/Control PredicatesValidation
(b) Completion of the goal refinement of the UCON PreA0 core model
Fig. 5 Goal model for the UCON PreA0 core model
Goal [Permit]
Refines: [PermitPreA0]
RefinedTo: [Permit Monitor/Control],
[PermitToAccess]
FormalDef: ( ∀ s:subject,
o:object,
r:right )
permitaccess(s, o, r)⇒ • (p1 ∧ . . .∧ pn )
Goal [CheckPredicates]
Refines: [PermitPreA0]
RefinedTo: [CP Monitor/Control],
[PredicatesValidation]
FormalDef: ( ∀ s:subject,
o:object,
r:right )
(p1 ∧ . . .∧ pn )⇒ • tryaccess(s, o, r)
Goal [TryToAccess]
Refines: [PermitPreA0]
FormalDef: ( ∀ s:subject, o:object, r:right )
tryaccess(s, o, r)⇒ • policyEnforcing(s, o, r)
[TryToAccess] is a final goal, in this case, a requirement on the domain of the
system (i.e. an assumption of the system). However, both [Permit] and [CheckPred-
icates] are sub-goals that can be further refined. [Permit] states for the access to be
permitted, the predicates controlling that access must be valid in the state before ac-
cess is granted. This then acts as a milestone for the next sub-goal, [CheckPredicates],
which further states that in the previous state to the state when the predicates were
valid, a request must have been received. Finally, the domain assumption is that this
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request implies that the policy was being enforced in the previous state. These three
sub-goals together fulfil the parent top goal.
In Figure 5(b), the completion of the goal refinement is shown, and the formal
definitions of each of the sub-goals follows in the text. We identify two requirement
goals, [PermitToAccess] and [PredicatesValidation], and assign two agents, the Ref-
erence Monitor and the Predicate Validator to respectively take care to each of these.
The other two sub-goals become assumptions on the domain; [Permit Monitor/Con-
trol] states that permitting access is performed by the reference monitor, and [CP
Monitor/Control] states that the validation of the relevant predicates on subject and
object attributes is performed by the predicate validation component. [PermitToAc-
cess] then refines [Permit] to include the role of the RM and PV components, and
similarly, [PredicatesValidation] also refines [CheckPredicates] to include the role of
the PV component.
Goal [Permit Monitor/Control]
Refines: [Permit]
FormalDef: ( ∀ s:subject, o:object, r:right,
RM:Reference Monitor,
PV:Predicate Validator )
permitaccess(s, o, r)⇔ RM.permitaccess(s, o, r)
Goal [PermitToAccess]
Refines: [Permit]
FormalDef: ( ∀ s:subject, o:object, r:right,
RM:Reference Monitor,
PV:Predicate Validator )
RM.permitaccess(s, o, r)
⇒ • PV.validate(p1 ∧ . . .∧ pn )
Resp: Reference Monitor
Goal [CP Monitor/Control]
Refines: [CheckPredicates]
FormalDef: ( ∀ s:subject, o:object, r:right,
PV:Predicate Validator )
(p1 ∧ . . .∧ pn )⇔ PV.validate(p1 ∧ . . .∧ pn )
Goal [PredicatesValidation]
Refines: [CheckPredicates]
FormalDef: ( ∀ s:subject, o:object, r:right,
PV:Predicate Validator )
PV.validate(p1 ∧ . . .∧ pn )
⇒ • tryaccess(s, o, r)
Resp: Predicate Validator
We are now capable of deriving the KAOS agent and operation models. Figure
6 shows the KAOS operation model, together with the agent/responsibility model.
As the reader can see, we identify a couple of operations: PermitAccess and
PredicateValidation, which operationalise the above requirements [Permit-
ToAccess] and [PredicatesValidation], respectively.
PermitToAccess PredicatesValidation
Resp
Resp
  Reference Monitor   Predicate Validator
  Subject
Object
Right
PermitAccess Perf
In
In
In
Predicate
ValidationResponse
PredicateValidation
In
Out
Perf
Fig. 6 The operation model for UCON PreA0 showing the agent/responsibility relations
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The operations are defined formally as follows.
Operation: PermitAccess
Performed By: Reference Monitor
Domain Pre-Condition:
¬ RM.permitaccess(s, o, r)
Domain Post-Condition:
RM.permitaccess(s, o, r)
Input: subject, object, right
ReqPre for [PermitToAccess]:
PV.validate(p1 ∧ . . .∧ pn )
Operation: PredicateValidation
Performed By: Predicate Validator
Domain Pre-Condition:
¬ PV.validate(p1 ∧ . . .∧ pn )
Domain Post-Condition:
PV.validate(p1 ∧ . . .∧ pn )
Input: Predicate
Output: ValidationResponse
ReqPre for [PredicatesValidation]: tryaccess(s, o, r)
These operations can be considered as the enforcement mechanism for the UCON
PreA0 model of security policies. Indeed, the approach itself is to derive the specifi-
cation of such enforcement mechanisms for any policy that the requirements specify
using the KAOS operationalisation (patterns) presented in [24]. The semantics of the
KAOS operations defines a set of proof obligations that lead to the realisation of the
required trigger, pre- and post- conditions of a goal, and therefore the satisfaction
of the goal itself. In this sense, and in our context, the proof of the semantics of an
operation, in relation to the required conditions of a goal, validates the fact that the en-
forcement mechanism represented by the operation indeed implements (i.e. enforces)
the corresponding UCON security policy expressed by the goal or requirement.
The only difference between these operations and those shown in Section 5 is
in the specification of the Required Pre-Condition clause. This clause is required to
ensure that the goals assigned to the individual agents are met. They are dependent on
the order of the operations as specified by the model definition. Other UCON models
encode a different sequentiality of the operations, and therefore may result in different
required conditions. The rest of the operations definitions are the same as specified
in Section 5. This strategy-based approach, is similar to that introduced in [22]. A
possibility for the encoding of such strategy directly in the policy is the use of an
operational policy language, such as for example a process algebra as that defined in
[5,10] with some notion of sequentiality. Alternatively, when writing UCON policies
using other policy languages, another possibility would be to encode the strategy
using an external scheduler, which is capable of implementing the right temporal
ordering for the execution of the enforcement mechanism’s operations.
6.2 Second Example: Refinement and Operationalisation of the UCON OnA3 Policy
In the UCON OnA3 core model, a usage control decision is determined by authorisa-
tions during the usage, and there is one or more attribute updates after this usage. We
require the policy to be enforced before as well as throughout and after the access is
permitted. The top goal is then the following, where we have used bounded temporal
operators with the time range [t1, t2] representing the period access takes place:
Goal [PermitOnA3]
RefinedTo: [PermitOnA3-pre], [PermitOnA3-on], [PermitOnA3-post]
FormalDef: ( ∀ s:subject, o:object, r:right )
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(permitaccess(s,o,r)⇒ <t1policyEnforcing(s,o,r)) ∧
(2t1,t2policyEnforcing(s,o,r)) ∧ (♦>t2policyEnforcing(s,o,r))
We have assumed that t1 is the time point at which access is granted, and t2 is the
point at which access ends. The first part of the conjunction states that the policy
must be enforced prior to when access starts, i.e. at time t1. The second part, on the
other hand, states that the policy must be enforced all the time during the access,
which is between the times t1 and t2. Finally, the third part states that the policy
also must eventually be enforced after the access has ended, i.e. after time t2. Note
that for the case when pre-authorisation is not an issue, the first part simply becomes
permitaccess(s,o,r)⇒ True.
We now apply a first goal refinement as shown in Figure 7(a). The formal defini-
tions of the three immediate sub-goals are given as follows:
Goal [PermitOnA3-pre]
RefinedTo:
[Permit], [TryToAccess]
FormalDef:
( ∀ s:subject, o:object,
r:right )
permitaccess(s, o, r)⇒
<t1policyEnforcing(s, o, r)
Goal [PermitOnA3-on]
RefinedTo:
[CheckPredicates]
[ContinuousCheck]
FormalDef:
( ∀ s:subject, o:object,
r:right )
permitaccess(s, o, r)⇒
2t1,t2policyEnforcing(s, o, r)
Goal [PermitOnA3-post]
RefinedTo:
[EndOrRevoke], [Update]
[PostUpdateCompleted]
FormalDef:
( ∀ s:subject, o:object,
r:right )
permitaccess(s, o, r)⇒
♦>t2policyEnforcing(s, o, r)
These sub-goals split the main goal by cases; before, during and after enforce-
ment of the UCON policy. The next level of refinement details more the enforcement
of the policy in each case:
Goal [Permit]
Refines: [PermitOnA3-pre]
RefinedTo: [Permit Monitor/Control],
[PermitToAccess]
FormalDef: ( ∀ s:subject, o:object, r:right )
permitaccess(s, o, r)⇒ •tryaccess(s, o, r)
Goal [TryToAccess]
Refines: [PermitOnA3-pre]
FormalDef: ( ∀ s:subject, o:object, r:right )
tryaccess(s, o, r)⇒ •policyEnforcing(s, o, r)
Goal [CheckPredicates]
Refines: [PermitOnA3-on]
RefinedTo: [CP Monitor/Control],
[OnValidation]
FormalDef: ( ∀ s:subject, o:object, r:right )
permitaccess(s, o, r)⇒ (p1 ∧ . . .∧ pn)
U (revokeaccess(s, o, r) ∨ endaccess(s, o, r))
Goal [ContinuosCheck]
Refines: [PermitOnA3-on]
FormalDef: ( ∀ s:subject, o:object, r:right )
(p1 ∧ . . .∧ pn ) U (revokeaccess(s, o, r) ∨
endaccess(s, o, r))⇒ 2t1,t2policyEnforcing(s, o, r)
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PermitOnA3
PermitOnA3-pre PermitOnA3-post
TryToAccess
Permit
PermitOnA3-on
CheckPredicates
ContinuosCheck
Update
PostUpdateCompleted
EndOrRevoke
(a) Initial goal refinement of an UCON OnA3 core model
Update
Update Monitor/Control
UpdateAfterEnd
CP Monitor/Control
OnValidation
CheckPredicatesPermit
Permit Monitor/Control
PermitToAccess
(b) Completion of the goal refinement of the UCON OnA3 goal model
Fig. 7 Goal refinement of the UCON OnA3 core model
Goal [EndOrRevoke]
Refines: [PermitOnA3-post]
FormalDef:
( ∀ s:subject, o:object,
r:right )
permitaccess(s, o, r)⇒
♦
(
endaccess(s, o, r)
∨ revokeaccess(s, o, r) )
Goal [Update]
Refines: [PermitOnA3-post]
RefinedTo:
[Update Monitor/Control],
[UpdateAfterEnd]
FormalDef:
( ∀ s:subject, o:object,
r:right )(
endaccess(s, o, r)
∨ revokeaccess(s, o, r) )⇒
♦update(s, o, r)
Goal [PostUpdateCompleted]
Refines: [PermitOnA3-post]
FormalDef:
( ∀ s:subject, o:object,
r:right )
update(s, o, r)⇒
♦>t2policyEnforcing(s, o, r)
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The [Permit] and [TryToAccess] refinements of the pre-authorisation stage represent
another sub-goal and an assumption on the domain, respectively. [Permit] states that
to be permitted access to the resource, the subject must have tried in the previous state
to access the resource with some right. [TryToAccess], on the other hand, states that
trying to access a resource implies that some relevant (UCON) policy is in place to be
applied. Note that since the policy is an on-going authorisation policy, there is no spe-
cific mention here of the kind of predicates needed to validate the pre-authorisation.
The next two sub-goals represent another domain assumption, [ContinuousCheck]
and another sub-goal, [CheckPredicates]. [CheckPredicates] represents the on-going
checks on the validity of the predicates, whereby such predicates must remain valid
until access is revoked by the system or ended by the subject. This is a specific def-
inition of on-going authorisation as was suggested by [8]. The righthand side of the
implication represents a milestone for the refinement [24], and as such, it reappears
in the domain assumption [ContinuosCheck], which states that the satisfaction of this
milestone condition leads to the assumption that the UCON policy is being upheld
throughout the whole period, t1 to t2, when access is taking place.
Finally, the last three sub-goals are the refinement of the post-authorisation stage,
which include two domain assumptions [EndOrRevoke] and [PostUpdateCompleted],
and another sub-goal [Update]. These three together again implement a milestone re-
finement strategy of their parent sub-goal. The first sub-goal, [EndOrRevoke], which
is a domain assumption, states that there is an assumption that permitting an access
will eventually lead to that access ending or being revoked. This then becomes the
milestone for the next sub-goal, [Update], which states that such an end or revoca-
tion of the right to access is eventually followed by some update of the subject or
resource’s attributes. Finally, the domain assumption [PostUpdateCompleted] states
that such an update of attributes assumes that the UCON policy will have been even-
tually enforced, beyond the completion time t2 of the access.
The second part of Figure 7(b), shows how the refinement process is completed
for the remaining sub-goals. This results in three more refinements, as defined below:
Goal [Permit Monitor/Control]
Refines: [Permit]
FormalDef: ( ∀ s:subject, o:object, r:right,
RM:Reference Monitor )
permitaccess(s, o, r)⇔
RM.permitaccess(s, o, r)
Goal [PermitToAccess]
Refines: [Permit]
FormalDef: ( ∀ s:subject, o:object, r:right,
RM:Reference Monitor )
RM.permitaccess(s, o, r)⇒
•tryaccess(s, o, r)
Resp: Reference Monitor
Goal [CP Monitor/Control]
Refines: [CheckPredicates]
FormalDef: ( ∀ s:subject, o:object, r:right,
PV:Predicate Validator )
(p1 ∧ . . .∧ pn )
⇔ PV.validate(p1 ∧ . . .∧ pn)
Goal [OnValidation]
Refines: [CheckPredicates]
FormalDef: ( ∀ s:subject, o:object, r:right,
PV:Predicate Validator )
permitaccess(s, o, r)⇒
PV.validate(p1 ∧ . . .∧ pn) U
(revokeaccess(s, o, r) ∨ endaccess(s, o, r))
Resp: Predicate Validator
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Goal [Update Monitor/Control]
Refines: [Update]
FormalDef: ( ∀ s:subject, o:object, r:right,
AM:Attribute Manager )
update(s, o, r)⇔ AM.update(s, o, r)
Goal [UpdateAfterEnd]
Refines: [Update]
FormalDef: ( ∀ s:subject, o:object, r:right,
AM:Attribute Manager,
RM:Reference Monitor )
(endaccess(s, o, r) ∨ revokeaccess(s, o, r))⇒
♦ AM.update(s, o, r)
Resp: Attribute Manager
[Permit] is refined to [Permit Monitor/Control], which is another sub-goal, and [Per-
mitToAccess], which is a requirement. [Permit Monitor/Control] states that permit-
ting an access is dependant on the decision of the Reference Monitor (RM) compo-
nent. This decision then itself depends on receiving, in a previous state, a request to
access as represented by the tryaccess signal, in the requirement [PermitToAccess].
This latter requirement is assigned a responsible agent, called the Reference Moni-
tor (RM). The next two sub-goals, again represent a sub-goal [CP Monitor/Control]
and a requirement [OnValidation], both of which refine the parent sub-goal [Check-
Predicates]. CP Monitor/Control states that the predicates required for the policy are
always checked by a component called the Predicate Validator (PV). This then results
in the requirement [OnValidation] being defined in terms of PV.
Finally, the last pair of refined sub-goals represents a sub-goal, [Update Monitor/-
Control], which is a sub-goal refining [Update], and a requirement [UpdateAfterEnd],
which is also refining [Update]. The first refined sub-goal, [Update Monitor/Control],
states that the updating action is performed by a new component called the Attribute
Manager (AM). This then allows us to redefine what an update is in terms of this
component, leading to the definition of the [UpdateAfterEnd] requirement.
We are now capable of deriving the KAOS agent and operation models, that will
operationalise the above three requirements. Figure 6.2 shows the KAOS agent/re-
sponsibility model, and the formal operational specification for the UCON OnA3
enforcement mechanism.
As shown in the figure, there are three operations. These are PermitAccess,
PredicateValidation and AttributeUpdate, derived using the KAOS op-
erationalisation patterns, most of them presented in [24]. It should be noted that the
formal specification of goals and operations allows the completeness, consistency
and minimality of operationalisation to be formally verified. The semantics of the
KAOS operations defines a set of proof obligations verifying that realising an oper-
ation when the required trigger, pre- and post- conditions of a goal are true implies
the goal. In this sense, a proof of the semantics of each operation in relation to the re-
quired conditions validates that operations implement (i.e. enforce) the corresponding
policies. The only difference between these operations and those shown in Section 5
is in the specification of the Required Pre-Condition and Required Post-Condition
clauses. These clauses are required to ensure that the assigned requirements are met.
7 Related Work
There are many approaches in the past (e.g. [25–28]) that have been proposed to
control access and usage in a Grid environment, not all of which would be directly
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  Predicate Validator
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PermitAccess Perf
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PredicateValidation
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UpdateAfterEnd
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  Attr ibute Manager
Attr ibute
Operation
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Operation: PermitAccess
Performed By: Reference Monitor
Domain Pre-Condition:
¬ RM.permitaccess(s, o, r)
Domain Post-Condition:
RM.permitaccess(s, o, r)
Input: subject, object, right
ReqPre for [PermitToAccess]:
tryaccess(s, o, r)
Operation: PredicateValidation
Performed By: Predicate Validator
Domain Pre-Condition:
¬ RM.permitaccess(s, o, r)
Domain Post-Condition:
RM.permitaccess(s, o, r)
Input: Predicate
Output: ValidationResponse
ReqPost for [OnValidation]:
PV.validate(p1 ∧ . . .∧ pn )
Operation: AttributeUpdate
Performed By: Attribute Manager
Domain Pre-Condition:
¬ AM.update(s, o, r)
Domain Post-Condition:
AM.update(s, o, r)
Input: subject, object, right
ReqPre for [UpdateAfterEnd]:(
endaccess(s, o, r) ∨
revokeaccess(s, o, r)
)
Fig. 8 KAOS Agent and Operation models for the enforcement mechanism for UCON OnA3
related to our approach. However, we mention here a few in order to contrast our
work and approach with the aforementioned approaches.
In [25], the authors propose a platform (PRIMA) for the fine-grained manage-
ment of access requests to Grid resources. While the approach is flexible in that ac-
cess rights can be managed externally to a resource in a fine-grained manner, it does
not consider the time continuity of such access requests, which is where our UCON-
based approach fits in. In [26], usage control in Grids is considered at a higher level
of abstraction; namely at the level of service level agreements. While this is comple-
mentary to our approach, it certainly does not provide the operational mechanisms
(i.e. the architecture) necessary for enforcing UCON-like policies. Other non-UCON
access control approaches have also been proposed, including attribute-based access
control (e.g. [27]) and role-based access control (e.g. [28]), however, these can be
expressed in the UCON model as was outlines in [3,8].
More realistically, this paper is associated with two strands of related work: policy
refinement and derivation of enforcement mechanisms. The use of goal-refinement
for refining policies as used here was introduced by Bandara et al. in [22]. The em-
phasis of [22] was on applying abduction techniques in order to determine the se-
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quence of events needed to achieve a goal given a system architecture that already
includes enforcement components. Close to Bandara’s work is Loyola’s work [29],
in which also policies refinement is defined by applying requirement engineering and
model checking techniques based on a temporal logic formalisation similar to the
one used in this paper. The approach adopted in [22] allows one to find system ex-
ecutions aimed at fulfilling low-level goals that logically entail high-level strategic
guidelines. From system executions, policy information is abstracted and eventually
encoded into a set of refined policies specified in Ponder. All the above approaches
have been applied to the networking management domain.
An alternative approach is presented by Chadwick et al. in [30], based on the
existence of a resource hierarchy. Their work exploits Semantic-Web technology to
automate the refinement process. We consider the representation of a resource hier-
archy as an interesting idea and plan to study as future work the inclusion of resource
hierarchy in goal-based approaches to policy refinement.
In relation to the derivation of enforcement mechanisms, Janicke et al. present in
[31] a framework for the derivation of enforcement mechanisms that guarantees com-
pliance with the policies. Their work is based on formalising the policies in Interval
Temporal Logic (ITL) and concentrates only on history-based access control policies.
Our work is more operational and we consider that our work can be linked better to
existing efforts in implementing usage control for Grids that we reviewed in Section
3. Nonetheless, our approach suffers from the lack of a direct method for expressing
the sequential order in which the derived operations related to a particular UCON
policy will need to be executed. Despite the fact that such encoding is possible (as a
additional layer of expressivity), the approach would benefit from enhancing the op-
erational model with a high-level language for expressing such execution strategies.
As such, more low-level operational languages, such as POLPA [5], adopt a different
approach whereby the policy specification itself encodes the execution strategy (i.e.
the temporal order in which operations are executed.) Another possibility in our case
would be to use an external scheduler, conscious of the UCON sub-model the policy
to be enforced pertains to.
8 Conclusion and Future Work
This paper presented a fine-grained access and usage control Grid authorisation ar-
chitecture with strong reference to the OGSA work [17], and a rigorous approach to
the design of an enforcement mechanism for usage control policies. We concentrated
on the UCONabc model proposed by Park and Sandhu [3] and studied its application
for the case of Grids. Our approach consists in applying the KAOS requirements en-
gineering methodology to the derivation of the enforcement mechanism, based on the
treatment of UCON policies as requirements. The UCON policies can be refined into
concrete requirements (that could be enforced by the resulting system) by repeat-
edly applying the KAOS goal refinement process. KAOS offers a formal language
to represent a goal/requirement based on temporal logic, which is similar to the for-
mal language used to give semantics to UCON models [3,8]. The refinement method
also includes strategies and patterns to guide the refinement process, and there is tool
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support aiding the user in this process [23]. We assigned the low-level policies to
software agents responsible for executing the operations that enforce the concrete
policies. Our resulting architecture consists of three agents: an Attribute Manager,
responsible for updating attributes associated to subjects and objects, a Predicate Val-
idator, responsible for validating policy predicates and a Reference Monitor, acting
as a gateway for all the usage decisions in the Grid.
In future works, we plan to use KAOS to formally analyse the requirements for
a general enforcement mechanism that covers the complete range of the UCONabc
policies, thus including not only authorisations (i.e. the UCONa family of models),
but also obligations (the UCONb model family) and conditions (the UCONc model
family). We plan to work on the definition of an architecture with the final objec-
tive of either propose a prototype, or extend the already developed implementations
for Grid authorisation systems (e.g. the OGF architecture). We shall also review the
already deployed policy languages and analyse their capacity to encode UCON poli-
cies, keeping in consideration the OGF recommendation on the use of standards. Fi-
nally, we plan to extend this work to the domain of Cloud computing by proposing an
architecture and a model for controlling access and usage for Cloud infrastructures.
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